Open the board →
claim ................ effect ................ signature
An AI system’s report of its own success is a self‑signed certificate.
It proves the system said it, not that it happened. Turiya reruns the claimed action and signs what actually happened, so anyone can check the result.
No receipt id? Browse the board →
The engraving is generated from that hash, and from nothing else. Change one character and the shape changes. This receipt's page carries the same mark.sympy/sympyclaimed fixed / effect: fails
The engraving is generated from that hash, and from nothing else. Change one character and the shape changes. This receipt’s page carries the same mark.
claimed fixed / effect: fails
Open the receipt and re-verify it → ·verify this receipt yourself →
The receipt is the product.
A verdict is never “true”. It is one of four states, and the receipt says which one the evidence supports.
falsifiedthe effect contradicts the claimnot_falsifiedprovisional, not proofcertifieda bounded formal checkindeterminatean honest refusal
Change one character and the signature fails. That is what a receipt proves: not that we were right, but that the record was not altered after it was signed.
The gap is between what a system says it did and what the effect was.
2 other verdicts · 10 code catches · 29 other systems · 5 fraud. Every receipt verifies in your browser → Open the board
These numbers are signed, and they count current receipts only. Withdrawn receipts are kept and published rather than deleted, so the withdrawal stays checkable: read them · Verify them ↑
Here’s exactly what happens.
One claim in, one signed verdict out. This is a real receipt, walked end to end.
Three steps. Two of them happen inside your environment.
Capture the Claim
Extract what the system asserted: a fixed bug, a passed test, a changed record.
claim + sourceRe-check the Effect
Independently re-run the real effect. Not the self-report.
real effectSign the Verdict
falsified · not_falsified (not proof) · certified (bounded) · indeterminate. Signed, content-addressed.
signed evidence| A tool fails silently | 0 of 60 |
| A field is silently null | 0 of 60 |
| A five-step pipeline, end to end | 12 of 40 |
| of which one step returns null | 12 of 30 |
| The value is confident and wrong | 0 of 20 |
Fabricated output by probe class, across 180 signed runs. All 12 land in the multi-turn pipeline, and every one of them came from a run with a null in it: the 10 control runs, which had none, fabricated zero times.
A falsifiable assertion, with an attributor and a source. No claim, no test. Run the claimed action again and read the result from the system that produced it. Ed25519-sign the verdict, content-address it, and hand back the receipt.
# pipeline
Claim
“This fix works.” / “It is safe.”
Compile
Into machine-checkable probes.
Re-run
Real repo, real test.
Sign
A stranger can verify it.
“I fixed sympy #24909” Bug with milli prefix · the system reported the fix worked
clone the repo at the buggy commit, isolated environment · real code
run the real FAIL_TO_PASS test, not the self-report.
recorded result: test still failing, test_passed: false
falsified: agent claimed fixed, the test still fails
independence
The observer takes no part.
Turiya means the witness: the fourth state that observes without being entangled in what it sees. The system under test keeps moving while it is read. A reading that bent the thing it measured would be worthless.
That is the mechanism, not a policy. The falsifier runs against a system without the system knowing it is being tested, and the verdict comes from something that never joined in.
claimed fixed / effect: fails
Built for the people who can’t grade their own homework.
Not software you install. A verification engagement.
One high-stakes workflow, re-run against what actually happened, inside your environment. Your code and data stay with you; what leaves is signed evidence you can pass to someone who won’t take your word for it.
one workflow · 100–500 claims
inside your environment
about two weeks
signed receipts + an assurance report
Any AI system that claims an effect. Cut by verifiability.
The engine is system-agnostic: predictive, generative, assistive, agentic, orchestrated, the whole tree. What decides whether we can verify a system is one question: does its claim leave a checkable effect?
One falsifier. Seventeen system types, each with a signed receipt.
Beyond the code catches and the fraud model above, the same claim-versus-effect engine signs a receipt across each of these system types. Where the system under test was honest, the receipt says so. We don’t manufacture a catch.
The same verifier, against a real fraud model.
Run on the real ULB MLG dataset (284,807 anonymized European card transactions, 0.17% fraud). A model that is 99.9% accurate still drifts 1.59× over time, and 22.6% of the fraud it catches can be evaded.
The fifth layer: the signed effect.
AI assurance usually gets described in four parts: monitoring (did the distribution shift?), security (can it be attacked?), capability (how good is it?), controls (are the processes right?). Those lines blur, and the firms working in them cross between them, so read this as where we sit rather than as a map of the market. The part they leave open is the one we take: the effect (did it do what it claimed), and we sign the answer. The other four can complement the signed effect. We sign the verdict. Not a benchmark score, not a PDF report. A signed receipt you can re-verify.
Independent verification is becoming a requirement.
Five Eyes said it in May 2026, before we did. Careful Adoption of Agentic AI Services is co-authored by CISA, the NSA and the Australian, Canadian, New Zealand and UK cyber centres. It states: “Agents may show a kind of ‘awareness’, altering their behaviour in order to achieve positive results while under evaluation, even if the evaluation is not active.” Its recommended control is to “flag discrepancies between stated intentions and observed behaviours.” That control is what we sell. Read the guidance
EU AI Act transparency duties and enforcement powers took effect 2 August 2026, ahead of the high-risk obligations in December 2027 and August 2028. California signed SB 813 + AB 1405 in September 2026: an AI Auditor Registry and a designation for independent verification organizations, carrying independence standards for who may conduct a covered audit. AIUC-1 certification mandates quarterly third-party re-testing under that framework. The question is no longer “should we verify?” It is “who signs the receipt?”
A verifier that never corrects itself is not a verifier. We publish our misses.
“the receipt is built to be re-run by a stranger” and “we publish the harness”: the first outran what a stranger can do, and the second was false. A stranger can verify a receipt’s signature in a browser; re-running the verification needs the harness, which we do not ship. How it reaches a customer is settled with them rather than decided in advance. Both sentences are corrected in the post; the gap stays listed on /independence.
“Hermes more than OpenClaw”: backwards. Both agents ran through one shared OpenClaw session, which suppressed its early failures. With a session per run it is Hermes 5/90 against OpenClaw 7/90, not 8 and 3. The headline rate barely moved (36.7% to 40.0%, inside the interval at n=30). The old receipt stays; a new signed record supersedes it.
“real credit-card fraud” (the fraud receipts’ dataset label): provenance not established. The data traces to a source with no dataset card and synthetic-looking merchant names. The falsification stands; the word “real” is withdrawn.
5 earlier corrections, the full record including every candidate we rejected, on the errata page. Found something we missed? Write to hello@turiyahq.com and it gets checked the same way.
Two prices are fixed.
Two prices are fixed: the sample is free, and a pilot on your own claim is $5,000, credited against your next engagement. Every engagement above that is scoped, because scope is what moves the number.
- We choose the claim and publish it
- A signed receipt you keep
- Verifiable in your browser
- No call required
- One claim on your own system
- Success criteria agreed in writing
- Credited against your next engagement
- A signed receipt you keep
A signature is not evidence.
Ed25519 proves a record was not altered after it was signed. It proves nothing about whether the record is right: not that the ground truth was correct, not that the tests were sufficient, not that the environment was representative.
Turiya verdict lattice · falsified / not_falsified / certified / indeterminate
Questions we would ask.
Is a signature evidence that the result is correct?
No. It is evidence that the record was not changed after signing. Correctness depends on the claim, the ground truth and the tests, and the receipt says what each of those was.
What does not_falsified mean?
That the probes did not break the claim. It is provisional, not proof. The lattice has no verdict called “true”.
Do you host our models or prompts?
The harness runs in your environment. We keep the receipt, which carries a hash, not the material. The one exception is expert review, and we disclose it before you sign.
What happens when verification cannot decide?
The verdict is indeterminate, or the run state is unsupported or error. We publish that, because a failed query is a gap, not a zero.
Can we verify a claim nobody made?
Then it is a measurement, not a falsification. The receipt names whose claim it is, or it says there was none.
What does a pilot cost?
A pilot on your own claim is $5,000, credited in full against an engagement. The free sample is a claim we choose and publish.
Bring one claim.
We will name it, re-run the effect, and sign what we find. The record survives the argument.
Scope a pilot